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Abstract 
Much like other developed economies during the global financial crisis, Belgium faced sub-
stantial systemic stress to its large and heavily concentrated financial system. To combat 
these mounting pressures, the Belgian government launched a wide-ranging, opt-in state 
debt guarantee program in a concerted effort to instill confidence and stymie the fear of runs 
in its financial sector. The debt guarantee scheme, pursuant to which eligible institutions 
could issue government-guaranteed debt, was originally put into place on October 15, 2008, 
and retroactively covered liabilities entered into from October 9, 2008, to October 31, 2009, 
with a maximum maturity of three years. It provided significant discretionary authority to 
the Minister of Finance, such as the ability to add additional conditions and to decline any 
bank from participating in the scheme. Eligibility was determined on a case by case basis. 
Fees and issuance thresholds were determined in the same way prior to two April 14, 2009, 
Royal Decrees, which homogenized fees and expanded the pool of eligible institutions. Bel-
gium was also a key member in a number of high profile bank rescues, such as that of Dexia 
in conjunction with France and Luxembourg. Much of the structure of the guarantee scheme 
was initially based on the ad hoc scheme that the three nations devised for Dexia earlier in 
October 2008. The state guarantee scheme expired after no banks had made use of it by Oc-
tober 31, 2010, the last day for banks to issue guaranteed debt after amendments to the is-
suance window and maturity horizon. 
Keywords: Belgium, short-term debt, medium-term debt, financial institutions, government 
guarantee, guarantee scheme 
  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-finan-
cial-crises/. 








At a Glance  
As the U.S. housing crisis exploded 
into a global phenomenon in 2008, 
dozens of large European financial in-
stitutions began facing run-like behav-
ior from their investors. Belgian 
banks, despite being more limited in 
their exposure than others, were no 
exception. As credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads of various maturities 
for large banks such as Dexia and For-
tis spiked from less than 100 basis 
points in May of 2008 to nearly 500 
basis points in September, Belgian au-
thorities stepped in. The Minister of 
Finance announced a state guarantee 
scheme on October 15, 2008, which 
drew heavily from a Belgian, French, 
and Luxembourg guarantee for Dexia 
that was finalized on October 14, 
2008.  
The state guarantee scheme entered into force retroactively, covering liabilities issued from 
October 9, 2008, to October 31, 2009, with a final maturity date of October 31, 2011, for a 
maximum maturity of just over three years. Eligible liabilities were quite broad, encompass-
ing bonds, debt securities, interbank, fiduciary, and central bank and institutional deposits, 
as well as commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and medium-term notes. Initially, the fee 
structures were unspecified. After requests from the European Central Bank for more clarity 
in consultation reports, as well as continued macroeconomic stresses across the region, the 
Belgian government issued the Royal Decree of 14 April 2009, which specified a 70 basis 
point set-up fee for the principal amount to be guaranteed, as well as a 100 basis point fee, 
paid quarterly, for the amount covered.  
The Belgian government did not opt to put an explicit ceiling on the guarantee. However, it 
did require banks to take measures that would “support their financial situation,” and in-
sisted that the guarantee be “justified in the interests of the Belgian economy and by the 
protection of all depositors.” Additionally, the Minister of Finance was at any time able to 
impose additional conditions and reject any institution.  
The program’s issuance window was extended once in September 2009, to October 31, 2010.  
No banks applied for or utilized the guarantee scheme. 
Summary Evaluation 
International Monetary Fund evaluation of Belgium’s crisis response measures made several rec-
ommendations but didn’t have much to say on the effectiveness (or potentially lack thereof) of the 
debt guarantee program. 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To restore confidence and liquidity to Belgian fi-
nancial institutions through the guaranteeing of short and 
medium-term liabilities for systemically important institu-
tions. 
Announcement Date October 15, 2008 
Operational Date October 15, 2008 
Date of First Guaranteed 
Loan issuance 
N/A 
Issuance Window   
Expiration Date 
October 31, 2009 (initial);  
extended to October  31, 
2010. 
Program Size  Unspecified 
Usage None 
Outcomes N/A  
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The Belgian Credit Guarantee Scheme: Belgium Context 
 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$471.1 billion in 2007 
$517.8 billion in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP 
in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$44,263.0 in 2007 




ing (5-year senior 
debt) 
 











Size of banking sys-
tem 
$411.1 billion in total assets in 2007 
$441.2 billion in total assets in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Size of banking sys-
tem as a percentage of 
GDP 
87.3% in 2007 
85.2% in 2008 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Size of banking sys-
tem as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data not available for Belgium 




of banking system 
 
96.4% of total banking assets in 2007  
95.4% of total banking assets in 2008  




in banking system 
13% of total banking assets in 2007  
14% of total banking assets in 2008  




ship of banking sys-
tem 
1% of banks owned by the state in 2005  
Source: World Bank BRSS 
 
Existence of deposit 
insurance 
 
Data not available for relevant time frame in 
Belgium 
Source: World bank Deposit Insurance Dataset 
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Following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, global financial markets were 
shaken significantly. This market pressure manifested itself as a global drying-up of liquidity 
and short and medium-term wholesale funding. The EURIBOR-OIS spread, which serves the 
same purpose as the oft-cited LIBOR-OIS spread as a proxy for overall market credit risk in 
European banks, rose from less than 10 basis points (bps) to almost 100 bps for all maturi-
ties, and nearly 165 bps for longer-term maturities in the third quarter of 2008.  
Belgian banks were no different, experiencing sharp declines in share prices and steep price 
increases for access to wholesale financing. Several of the largest banks, including Fortis and 
Dexia, saw premiums on their credit default swaps (CDS) of various maturities shoot up by 
several hundred basis points, peaking out at around 500 bps for the two (2009 Financial 
Stability Overview). In particular, four of the largest Belgian institutions—Dexia, Ethias, For-
tis, and KBC—faced potential liquidity shortages as institutional depositors and other 
sources of wholesale funding continued to pull away.  
This lack of liquidity prompted the Belgian government to push an unprecedented amount 
of State aid into its financial sector. Aid ranged from increasing the deposit insurance ceiling 
from €20,000 to €100,000; to substantial targeted capital injections for a small group of sys-
temically important financial institutions totaling tens of billions of euros; to broad-based 
State guarantee schemes to cover assets and liabilities entered into by Belgian financial in-
stitutions. This case study focuses specifically on the government’s program to guarantee 
liabilities. 
Program Description 
The original credit guarantee, based on the Law of October 15, 2008, in the Belgian Official 
Gazette, aimed to restore confidence in the financial sector and promote access to funding 
sources that had been closed off by the global credit crunch. The Law of October 15, 2008, 
introduced Article 117bis in the Law of 2 August 2002 (later abrogated by Article 23 of the 
Law of July 2, 2010).3  Article 117bis gave the Belgian government the ability to enact policies 
that could deviate from implemented financial statutes based on exigent circumstances and 
the condition of its financial system. It provided Belgian authorities a substantial amount of 
legal flexibility in a time of crisis and specifically vested the Belgian government4 with the 
power to adopt a “system of guarantees of commitments entered into by supervised institu-
tions” (Article 117bis, Belgian National Gazette, 2008-10-15). Solvency and liquidity con-
cerns, particularly with larger banks like Dexia, Fortis, and others, had been mounting, and 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3 Article 117 itself specified that the National Bank of Belgium (NBB), the Banking, Finance, and Insurance Com-
mission (CBFA), and the Office of Insurance Control (OCA) work together and collaborate on matters of com-
mon interest, which included (1) “the stability of the financial system as a whole”; (2) “the interactions between 
prudential supervision and control of systemic risks of payment and settlement systems”; (3) “coordination of 
crisis management”; and (4) “the guarantee of deposits and the protection of investors”, among others (Article 
117, Belgian National Gazette, 2002-09-04). 
4 The king acting by Royal Decree, i.e. a mandatory legal act of general application adopted by the executive 
branch. 
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the adoption of Article 117bis by the Law of October 15, 2008, pursuant to which eligible 
institutions could issue government-guaranteed debt, allowed Belgian authorities to imple-
ment any programs necessary to alleviate these substantial pressures. The government im-
plemented Article 117bis and adopted the Royal Decree of December 10, 2008, on the guar-
antee of certain risks assumed by financial institutions. 
The types of eligible liabilities were extensive, and included, “all of the financing raised by a 
beneficiary institution in order to obtain refinancing from credit institutions and institu-
tional counterparties and would cover instruments such as bonds and debt securities issued 
by the beneficiary to institutional investors, as well as interbank deposits, fiduciary deposits, 
deposits of central banks, deposits of institutions, commercial paper, certificates of deposit 
and medium-term notes.” There was some objection to the breadth of the eligibility criteria 
by the European Central Bank (ECB), specifically with respect to the decision to include in-
terbank deposits. No specific liabilities were excluded (European Central Bank 2008b). 
Participating financial institutions were required to meet the following conditions: (1) ben-
eficiaries would take measures aimed at supporting their financial situation, solvency, and 
liquidity, and (2) the granting of a guarantee would be justified in the interests of the Belgian 
economy and by the protection of all depositors. The ECB raised objections to these condi-
tions as well, citing the Law of 2 August 2002’s requirement of a “sudden crisis on the finan-
cial markets or of a serious threat of systemic crisis” and arguing that Belgium’s conditions 
did not reflect this requirement. These conditions were not amended in the final version of 
Article 117bis.  
To have their debt guaranteed by the government, institutions also had to prove that (1) they 
were unable to issue new liabilities to cover maturing liabilities absent the guarantee and 
(ii) the guarantee was be “necessary to ensure their continuity.” Additionally, the Minister of 
Finance was allowed to lay down further conditions for the guarantee, including “setting its 
ceiling, specifying the remuneration to be paid for the granting of the guarantee, and any 
other modality aimed at ensuring compliance with the two abovementioned conditions” (Eu-
ropean Central Bank 2008b).  
The Belgian approach was an “opt-in” one, so banks had to apply to gain access to the guar-
antee. The fee structure was originally unspecified, suggesting that a per-bank analysis 
would be used to assess the exact fee amounts (European Central Bank 2008c) The policy 
could be applied retroactively, covering bonds that had been issued or renewed from Octo-
ber 9, 2008, until October 31, 2009, with maturity dates of no later than October 31, 2011. 
Therefore, guaranteed obligations could have maturities of slightly more than three years at 
most. 
While the fee structures were unspecified in the original agreement (European Central Bank 
2008c), another Royal Decree, issued on April 14, 2009, clarified and homogenized the fees. 
The amendment provided that the guarantee fee consisted of: (1) a set-up fee of 70 basis 
points (bps) of the principal amount covered by the guarantee, and (2) an annual guarantee 
fee of 100 bps of the principal amounts covered by the guarantee, paid quarterly.  
Outcomes 
The guarantee scheme was renewed on October 7, 2009, by Belgian authorities despite a lack 
of usage. This extension was made primarily because it was seen as “necessary given the 
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continuation of financial market turbulence, and in particular financial institutions’ contin-
ued refinancing difficulties.” Belgian authorities extended the final maturity date of the State 
guarantee from October 31, 2011, to October 31, 2014. Additionally, the window during 
which guaranteed liabilities could be issued was extended from October 31, 2009, to October 
31, 2010. Last, the maximum maturity window was also increased to match the new condi-
tions. On October 14, 2009, the Belgian, French, and Luxembourg authorities would, on Oc-
tober 14, 2009, amended the issuance window and maturity horizon in the Dexia agreement 
in the same way. 
Despite the extension, no banks applied for the guarantee scheme. The scheme therefore ex-
pired on October 31, 2010.  
II. Key Design Decisions  
1. The State guarantee scheme was a part of a package of State policy measures 
passed in October 2008 to instill confidence in the Belgian banking system.  
In addition to the debt guarantee scheme, the Belgian government also increased its limit of 
deposit insurance covered by the Protection Fund from €20,000 to €100,000. They also in-
corporated a broad-based asset protection scheme from the Royal Decree of December 10, 
2008, that covered, “directly or indirectly, losses or risks of losses on financial assets held by 
subsidiaries, whether direct or indirect, of the guaranteed entity,,” and capital injections for 
certain large institutional rescues as well. The Belgian government also engaged in a number 
of ad hoc rescues, the most notable of which being that of Dexia. The Dexia agreement, final-
ized on October 14, 2009, served as the model for the State guarantee scheme. 
2. The 2008 guarantee scheme drew its authority from Article 117bis, an amendment 
to the Law of August 2, 2002, by the Law of October 15, 2008. 
Article 117bis, introduced by the Law of October 15, 2008, added to the statutory authority 
of Article 117 of the Law of August 2, 2002, which specifically outlined financial stability and 
crisis management, among other things, as matters of common interest between the National 
Bank of Belgium (NBB) and the Banking, Finance, and Insurance Commission (CBFA). Article 
117bis allowed the Belgian government to “provide for supplements to, or deviations from, 
the Belgian Credit Institutions Supervision Law, the Insurance Undertakings Supervision 
Law, the Investment Services Law, and the Financial Sector and Financial Services Supervi-
sion Law” under exigent circumstances. It also provided for “a system of State guarantees for 
credit institutions, insurance undertakings and other financial institutions (as will be further 
determined by Royal Decree)”.  
3. The guarantee scheme was subject to European Commission approval. 
As a form of state aid, the guarantee scheme was subject to review and approval by the Eu-
ropean Commission. 
4. There was no explicit maximum amount that the Belgian government would guar-
antee. 
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Belgian authorities’ approach was to evaluate any bank that came forward on a case-by-case 
basis. While no guaranteed debt was issued, a total size was never specified for the program. 
5. Most Belgian financial institutions were eligible. 
All credit institutions, financial holding companies, investment firms, as well as any financial 
institution under prudential supervision were eligible to participate (Petrovic and Tutsch 
2009). 
6. The types of eligible debt were very broad, and included liabilities of supervised 
institutions, commercial paper, and interbank deposits, among others.  
Specifically, the Belgian government publicly announced that liabilities covered included “all 
of the financing raised by a beneficiary institution in order to obtain refinancing from credit 
institutions and institutional counterparties and would cover instruments such as bonds and 
debt securities issued by the beneficiary to institutional investors, as well as interbank de-
posits, fiduciary deposits, deposits of central banks, deposits of institutions, commercial pa-
per, certificates of deposits and medium-term notes” (European Central Bank 2008b). 
However, the ECB indicated in its initial consultations on the law that it believed the criteria 
for eligible debt was too broad, particularly with the inclusion of interbank deposits. Their 
concerns primarily addressed the possibility that such broad-based eligibility criteria would 
harm euro-area efforts to harmonize monetary policy responses. The Belgian government 
did not address these criticisms and kept interbank deposits among the covered liabilities 
(European Central Bank 2008b). 
7. The maximum maturity for guaranteed debt under the original agreement was 
slightly more than three years, with an ultimate maturity date of October 31, 2011. 
The maximum maturity and ultimate date were both extended in 2009. 
Debt that would have been issued under the October 2008 guarantee had an ultimate ma-
turity date of up to October 31, 2011. Therefore, the maximum maturity for any guaranteed 
debt would have been slightly more than three years. However, the issuance window and 
maturity horizon were extended on October 7, 2009, to October 31, 2011, and for liabilities 
maturing up to October 31, 2014, respectively, providing for a maximum potential maturity 
of slightly more than five years.  
8. All currencies appear to have been eligible for the scheme. 
Program documents did not contain any restrictions on the currencies eligible for participa-
tion in the scheme. 
9. There were no explicit individual caps.  
There is no indication that there were individual ceilings on the amount of guaranteed debt 
that a given institution could issue.  
10. Fee structures were implied to be case by case at the start of the agreement, but 
were later clarified by the Royal Decree dated April 14, 2009, as on a flat-fee basis. 
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The State guarantee fee structures were originally to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
(European Central Bank 2008c), but were further specified by the Royal Decree of April 14, 
2009. The fees included a set-up fee of 70 bps of the principal amount the guarantee covered 
and an annual guarantee fee of 100 bps of the principal amounts covered by the guarantee, 
paid quarterly. 
11. Banks had to take broad-based measures to improve their financial situation and 
prove there was sufficient need for a guarantee. 
Participation conditions for beneficiaries mandated that institutions “take measures aimed 
at supporting their financial situation, solvency, and liquidity,” and that, should a guarantee 
be granted, it would be in the interests of the Belgian economy and by the protection of all 
depositors.  
After being approved, beneficiaries were able to issue government-guaranteed debt only if 
they were able to show that it would not be possible for them to meet the liabilities that 
would be covered by said guarantee at their maturity without it and that the invoking of said 
State guarantee was necessary for the beneficiary’s continuity (European Central Bank 
2008b). 
12. There were no additional conditions imposed for the State guarantee scheme. 
However, the Minister of Finance was entitled to impose more if he or she saw fit. 
The Finance Minister had substantial discretionary authority to “lay down further modalities 
and conditions for a State guarantee, including setting its ceiling, specifying the remunera-
tion to be paid for the granting of the guarantee, and any other modality aimed at ensuring 
compliance with the two abovementioned conditions” (European Central Bank 2008b) The 
Minister of Finance also had the authority to terminate any guarantee agreement at any time. 
13. The issuance window for the program originally ended at the end of October 2009, 
but it was extended for another year.  
The original State guarantee was implemented October 17, 2008, retroactive from October 
9, 2008, and extending to October 31, 2009, with an ultimate maturity date of October 31, 
2011. It was later further extended on October 7, 2009, which lengthened the issuance win-
dow to October 31, 2010, and the ultimate maturity date to October 31, 2014. 
III. Evaluation 
There does not appear to be any specific formal analysis for the Belgian credit guarantee 
scheme. However, in 2013, the IMF released a comprehensive analysis of how the Belgian 
government responded to the global financial crisis (GFC), including best practice guidelines. 
Some of the recommendations that the Fund made included (1) enhancing the National Bank 
of Belgium’s resolution authority by broadly formalizing and making explicit many of its 
powers; (2) requiring recovery and resolution plans for any systemically important Belgian 
firm; (3) formalizing frameworks for bank resolution and/or insolvency, with consideration 
given to further broaden these for holding companies and non-systemic institutions; and (4) 
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ensuring strict conditionality on any agreements or guarantees made (International Mone-
tary Fund 2013). 
It is worth noting that, while the IMF made several sweeping recommendations in their re-
port, they had very little to say on the effectiveness (or potential lack thereof) of the debt 
guarantee program. The only specific recommendation they had with respect to guarantees 
was that the National Bank of Belgium should “henceforth exercise restraint in granting new 
guarantees to avoid a further migration of potential private losses to the sovereign balance 
sheet” (International Monetary Fund 2013). 
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